By the end of 2022, some speculated that a Ron DeSantis bid for president might be simply a coronation. In swing state after swing state, midterm voters rejected Republican candidates with Donald Trump’s fingerprints on them. In many state and national primary polls, DeSantis’s support spiked. The final scene of the last act of the Trump Show was at hand.
By May 2023, it seems like the Trump Show could possibly have some more scenes—and maybe even acts—left. To some extent, it’s to be expected that Trump would bounce back from his December 2022 lows. On-going legal investigations were bound to keep him in the spotlight, and fear of Trumpian retaliation remains a powerful force among elected Republicans.
Thus, a 2024 DeSantis presidential run might instead be an insurgency campaign, in which a political change agent charges against a dominant frontrunner. Ronald Reagan in 1976, Barack Obama in 2008, and both Trump and Bernie Sanders in 2016 might be examples of insurgency campaigns. Trump was in many respects the frontrunner throughout most of the 2016 primary cycle after he declared, but he was also running against the consensus of other Republican electeds and the GOP’s party machinery, so that counts as an insurgency effort.
In thinking through the dynamics of the 2024 primary cycle (and this goes far beyond DeSantis), we could learn something by looking at the trajectory of past insurgency candidates, a possible insurgency blueprint, and the lessons of 2008 for today.
An Ethos—Not an Echo
Insurgent candidates generally need an distinctive campaign theme to differentiate themselves from the putative establishment favorite. Obama tapped into a generational theme—the sense of turning a page on the age of Clintonian triangulation and the conventional Washington politics of compromise. Instead, he promoted a more strenuous politics of conflict. In the 2008 primary, the Iraq War became one of the key points of leverage for his campaign against Clinton and his call for a new paradigm.
As an insurgent candidate in 2016, Trump also used a broader theme to help reorient the Republican Party around himself. “Build the wall,” attacks on NAFTA and the WTO, and an “America First” foreign policy decidedly broke from the bipartisan orthodoxies of the neoliberal era. This distinctive policy approach was an essential political beachhead for Trump. Especially since 2020, Trump has de-emphasized policy for his political brand. That may be a political opportunity for his rivals. Nevertheless, there was a key message from Trump in 2016 (both continuous with and a break from Obama’s politics of conflict): Washington has screwed everything up, and I alone can fix it.
So what would the animating ethos of an insurgent Republican candidacy look like? Certain themes seem unlikely to work. A Bush restorationist effort could have worse odds than Powerball. Running as the anti-Trump candidate would probably have the same results as other campaigns obsessively focused on opposing Trump or “Trumpism”: washing out while increasing Trump’s appearance of dominance.
While seemingly more plausible, a Tea Party insurgency centered on a combination of social conservatism and fiscal austerity might also face an uphill battle. Ted Cruz ran a variant of this against Trump in the 2016 primary, and Mike Pence may be considering mounting a similar campaign in the 2024 cycle. However, there’s considerable evidence that a major chunk of Republican voters are not ideologically disciplined in accord with this approach. For instance, many primary voters might be concerned about federal spending in the abstract but also wary about particular cuts to many government programs, including entitlements. A significant portion of these voters are also quite willing to show flexibility on social issues—as demonstrated by Trump’s primary victory in 2016.
A more plausible route for an insurgency candidate might be going beyond Trump.
“Competent Trumpism” may also not be enough for an insurgency candidacy. Just like Trump, only more measured might be like heavy metal, only melodious. Trump as a political actor is defined by outrageousness, and a “competent Trumpism” pitch might look like only a diluted version of pure, uncut Donald. Successful presidential candidates usually don’t market themselves as an updated version of a predecessor. That goes double for insurgency candidates. (George HW Bush’s “kinder, gentler” 1988 campaign might be a partial exception to that, but his example—a vice president trying to claim the mantle of a president who won two landslides—doesn’t apply here. And Bush in 1988 was no insurgency candidate.)
A more plausible route for an insurgency candidate might be going beyond Trump. It might take elements from the Trumpian turn in Republican politics, but it would also offer a new fusion. This fusion would confront the obvious weaknesses of Trump’s time as president (the chaos, the broken promises, the constitutional disruption). Perhaps even more importantly, it would adapt to the realities of 2023, which are substantially different from those of 2016.
In 2016, the neoliberal model of politics had deep internal vulnerabilities, but it still enjoyed a kind of superficial consensus. That’s no longer the case in 2023. Politicians on both sides of the aisle as well as leaders abroad have increasingly turned to a model of resilience that is premised on shoring up key strategic industries. While Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has galvanized Western resistance, it has also helped prompt a broader geopolitical rebalancing. An inreasingly assertive People’s Republic of China aims to challenge the role of the U.S. in key parts of the infrastructure of globalization. Questions of identity and political belonging have flared up in American politics, especially since 2020. The American public may also have grown disillusioned with the politics of conflict. Poll after poll indicates that American voters would prefer a choice other than Trump or Biden, suggesting that there is a desire for new political blood. (See also Reihan Salam’s points about the return to “normalcy” here.)
We the People Politics
A possible template for an insurgency candidacy might be a “we the people” approach. Successful insurgency candidates require a strong ethos and are not simply reducible to policy positions. However, policy can also be part of this ethos (as Obama and Trump have shown). “We the people” politics would seek to strengthen a sense of democratic and local agency by, for example, empowering parents on education and reasserting democratic controls on the administrative state. It would also have stakes for political economy. It might show a wariness about corporate concentration and overweening corporate power. But it would also attend to key pocketbook issues: preserving crucial federal entitlements, improving economic outcomes for working families, and confronting key cost burdens (such as health care).
“We the people” politics could combine an assertion of democratic sovereignty with a defense of many of the inherited liberties of the American regime.
A politics of some “people” is one of the key tropes of the nation and many democratic theories. “We the people” politics could combine an assertion of democratic sovereignty with a defense of many of the inherited liberties of the American regime. “We the people” politics would hold that American greatness does not come from tearing down constitutional institutions. Rather than dividing American politics into warring camps, it would find that we are all in the political compact together. This does not mean that there cannot be political differences, but those differences should not obscure deeper civic bonds. The past decade’s politics of division has helped make the government less worthy of the American people and less capable of responding to new strategic challenges. The aim of government under this model should less be fidelity to some abstract ideological scheme and more a commitment to the flourishing of the people. That flourishing might, of course, include many liberties and political decentralization. “We the people” politics might recognize that we as people have different voices.
Signs of an Insurgency?
If you squint, there are certain (albeit limited) parallels between the shape of the Republican race today and the 2008 Democratic primary.
Throughout 2007, Hillary Clinton was the clear leader in national polls, hovering somewhere in the 40s. Barack Obama hung about 20 points behind her. And John Edwards and other candidates were far in the distance.
Especially after his indictment, Donald Trump has a significant lead in national polls. Like Clinton, Trump has tried to define himself as the center of his party’s political gravity by rolling out one endorsement after another. Like Barack Obama, Ron DeSantis trails by double digits in most national polls. As with the 2008 race, other likely candidates for the Republican nomination remain clustered in the realm of single digits and rounding errors.
Even the criticisms of Ron DeSantis from the Trump camp often echo the attacks from Clinton World on Obama. The junior senator from Illinois was inexperienced. He should wait his turn. Someday, he would be a good president—but not this cycle.
In Clinton’s case, seeming political strength masked significant weaknesses. As Mark Halperin and John Heilemann reported in Game Change, many top Democrats had secret reservations about her strength as a candidate. The Obama campaign out-organized Clinton in many key states. His victory in the Iowa caucuses punctured Clinton’s façade of inevitability, and his national numbers shot upward. The 2008 primary was a trench warfare of delegates, but Obama retained an edge throughout much of the struggle and ended up clinching the nomination.
Of course, there are limits to these comparisons. Democrats came off a “wave” victory in 2006, so they entered 2008 with the wind at their backs. Senate wins in Virginia, Ohio, and Florida presaged Obama’s victory in those states in 2008. By contrast, Republicans had a very disappointing midterm in 2022. Hillary Clinton was a relatively unknown quantity as a presidential candidate in 2007. By 2023, Trump is thoroughly known. While the relationship of the American press to Hillary Clinton has long been contentious, elite press outlets helped boost Donald Trump in the 2016 Republican primary and may be inclined to do so again in the 2024 cycle. Many of Clinton’s rivals for the 2008 nomination were willing and even eager to attack her. In 2024 (as in 2016), Republican candidates for president may be more interested in stopping other rivals to Trump than defeating Trump himself.
DeSantis’s coronavirus policies checked the excesses of medical technocrats and also aimed to ensure that public goods (such as public education) could actually be used by the public.
Could DeSantis take up the banner for a “we the people” politics? Well, his record may have some points compatible with this strategy. As governor, DeSantis partnered with Democrats and Republicans in the state legislature to exempt various products for small children (such as diapers) from the state sales tax. His administration has promoted numerous incentives for tech and manufacturing. The state legislature has recently passed a bill that dramatically expands school choice.
DeSantis’s approach to state and local government has emphatically not been a “starve the beast” strategy. Instead, he campaigned on raising the salaries of government workers—especially teachers and police officers. But he has also asserted democratic oversight over public K-12 education. His coronavirus policies checked the excesses of medical technocrats and also aimed to ensure that public goods (such as public education) could actually be used by the public.
In his recent speech at the Heritage Foundation, DeSantis emphasized many of these themes. He castigated the “culture of losing” in the GOP and implicitly contrasted the discipline of his gubernatorial staff with the West Wing soap opera of the Trump years. While he spoke about the need to take bold action, he also celebrated his ability to win big in his reelection: governing well can expand a political coalition. He made much of his opposition to coronavirus restrictions supported by technocrats but also argued that one of the dangers of the “administrative state” at the moment is that it appeals to a politics of division—that its “power has been weaponized and wielded by one faction of society against other factions of society that it doesn’t like.” He tapped into long-standing republican traditions in warning about the dangers of concentrated corporate power.
Thus, there may be some signs that DeSantis could execute that kind of “we the people” pivot. His durable performance in polling suggests that he would be the most likely to pull off a successful insurgency campaign, but other Republicans—whether or not they harbor presidential ambitions—could also adopt a “we the people” paradigm.
Turning the Page
Successful insurgency candidates confront some underlying political frustration. For Obama in 2008, it was the Iraq War. For Trump and Sanders in 2016, it was the costs of the post-2001 iteration of globalization (as well as the broader discrediting of many elite institutions). Amid deep structural challenges, U.S. politics today risks being caught in a retaliatory doom loop. Biden adapted some Trumpian themes on trade, infrastructure, and industrial policy, but he has in many respects doubled down on the politics of denunciation and retaliation. Obama, Trump, and now Biden have all called for destabilizing the American constitutional infrastructure (notably, they all support overturning regular order in the Senate). The American people may be open to a candidate who seeks to confront underlying problems rather than simply scapegoat other Americans as the problem. A “we the people” mode of politics could incorporate some of the key elements of populist disruption while also moving beyond the tired deadlock of vitriolic dysfunction.
Other links:
Robert VerBruggen on why U.S. immigration system should prioritize skills.
Policy package from American Compass on using immigration policy to tighten the labor market.
Steven Camarota and Karen Zeigler look at connections between immigration rates and worker wages.
Angela Rachidi argues that American family life may be more affordable after all.
Brad Setser on the PRC’s trade surpluses.
Charles Fain Lehman on the shrinking American lifespan.
Dan McLaughlin raises doubts about a “dark horse” Republican presidential nominee.
RIP longtime Manhattan Institute intellectual Fred Siegel.
Thanks for reading!